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This dissertation explores the concepts of non-disclosure and misrepresentation in South 
African law. The principal focus surrounds the effect non-disclosure as a form of 
misrepresentation has on the liability of contracting parties. In order to explore this effectively, 
the study explores the concept of duty of disclosure, and whether such a duty exists in South 
African law. Instances when a duty to disclose arises are explained, such as positive steps taken 
to conceal facts, the seller having sole knowledge of the material fact, an omission or 
misleading language, and a change in circumstances. Similarly to the English law duty of 
disclosure in relation to information in contracts uberrimae fidei, the similar South African law 
concept in insurance or agency contracts known as ‘utmost good faith’, is discussed and 
explored. The study determines whether such a concept should be a mandatory requirement in 
pre-contractual negotiations. Additionally, this study explores the various avenues of relief that 
are available to those who have fallen victim to misrepresentation. This results in an analysis 
of the effectiveness and success of the current traditional methods of claiming and quantifying 
damages that are adopted by South African legislature and the judiciary. The discussion then 
explores the proposed alternate method which aims to combine a claim into one of delict and 
that of contractual liability, or on the other hand institute a claim solely based on contractual 
liability. Lastly, this study explores the effect the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 has had 
on contractual agreements, remedies and penalties, and how this ground-breaking legislation 
has altered the approach previously adopted by the common law and whether it has done 




Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
South African law is a multifaceted and mixed legal system. The background and history of 
South Africa has led to a unique approach not only to the law of contract, but the way a 
layperson interprets and understands contractual performance and their reciprocating 
obligations. 
 
The background of contract law and the relevant basic principles that we take for granted sets 
out the framework for this dissertation. In order for a valid contractual agreement to be in 
existence, certain elements must be present. One such elements is that there must be a 
consensus or a ‘meeting of the minds’1 between the contracting parties.2 Moreover, the 
contracting parties must see eye to eye with regard to all facets of the contract.3 Where a party 
has entered a contract, or otherwise been induced to enter said contract as a result of a false 
representation by the other party, this amounts to misrepresentation.4  
 
Whether a duty of disclosure exists varies in each jurisdiction. In South African law there is no 
general duty of disclosure.5 In a contractual context, disclosure and the duty to disclose, relates 
to any pertinent or material information that a contractor should divulge to the contracting party 
if the failure to disclose said information would affect whether the latter party entered into the 
contract or not6. The uncertainty surrounding whether there is a duty to disclose in South 
African law has spread to other areas of a contract. Misrepresentation, and the corresponding 
liability, is often regarded as only occurring when a positive act has been committed by a 
contractor in order to induce the other party to enter into the contract. This study shows that is 
incorrect, as there are a number of scenarios that impose a duty to disclose information on the 
contracting party.7  
 
Conversely, despite the fact that the aforementioned instances exist there are still certain types 
of contracts in different industries that are treated differently. Contracts that seemingly require 
a higher duty of disclosure are those relating to insurance or agency. These are required to have 
                                                           
1 Consensus ad idem. 
2 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7ed (2016) 29-30. 
3 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7ed (2016) 29-30. 
4  RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7ed (2016) 315. 
5 ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche 2003 (1) SA 176 SCA. 
6 SPF and Another v LBCCT/A LB and Another (26492/13) [2016] ZAGPPHC 378 at para 21. 
7 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7ed (2016) 322-331. 
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been negotiated in ‘utmost good faith’.8 In comparison, a party to a contract of sale who has 
specific knowledge that can impact whether the transaction will be concluded or not, has no 
duty to disclose such information to the other contracting party.9 This creates uncertainty 
amongst the parties of a contract regarding whether this duty exists in our law or not. This leads 
to the question of whether the time has come for distinct and unambiguous legislative 
intervention to put an end to the debate. The importance of entering into a contract while being 
aware of all the material facts, as well as equipped with all the necessary information to validly 
consent to the transaction, cannot be overemphasized. However, it is still possible for people 
to be lulled into a false sense of security due to any fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of 
the other contracting party, or as a result of his or her silence. This can be avoided if there was 
a duty to disclose certain facts prior to concluding the contract, and not only those that are 
currently deemed to be material. 
 
It is imperative to gain clarity for laypersons as to when a party cannot remain silent and is 
required to speak, and more importantly when the failure to do so will result in liability. South 
Africans who do not have a specialised knowledge of the law of contract enter into various 
agreements on a ‘good faith’ basis daily. These agreements are the centre of South African 
culture, and are founded on the basis that all parties involved will negotiate and contract with 
good intentions and on good faith and ubuntu. The importance of good faith and ubuntu in a 
contract, especially in a society as unique as ours, was observed and regarded as vital by the 
Constitutional Court.10 In spite of this acknowledgement, there has been no proper 
development of the common law as to implement these concepts into our law. When the 
concept of good faith was adopted from Roman-Dutch law, the problems were adopted along 
with it. The ambiguous and vague nature of the concept was never clarified in South African 
law of contract.11 
 
This leads to the question of whether the current legislation has done enough to protect the 
consumer. In order to determine this, chapter two of this study addresses the issues identified 
                                                           
8 ‘The art of law – a would-be purchaser must be cautious and protect his own interests’ 
http://www.roodtinc.com/archive/newsletter157.asp, accessed on 16 March 2018. 
9 Umso Construction (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Roads and Public Works Eastern Cape Province (20800/2014) 
ZASCA 61. 
10 Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd (CCT 105/10) 2011 ZACC 30. Majority 
Moseneke DCJ at para 71. 
11 E van der Sijde ‘The role of good faith in the South African law of contract’ (unpublished LLM thesis, 




by exploring the current position of duty of disclosure in South African law, and when this duty 
arises. In addition, whether the element of negotiating in good faith is part of the law of 
contract. After exploring these concepts, chapter three explores the traditional method of 
quantifying damages, and thereafter this study attempts to seek developments in the law. This 
is done by exploring an alternate method of claiming and quantifying damages, and 
determining whether this is in fact a viable option or not. Chapter four explores the inroads 
made by the Consumer Protection Act, and the effect it has had on the common law. Lastly, 
chapter five aims to provide viable solutions to the issues raised. This concluding chapter 
explores the ways in which the Consumer Protection Act needs to be developed in order to 
better protect consumers, and provides an argument for the development of the common law 
to include good faith in South African law of contract.  
 
This study is an important avenue to advance our knowledge and understanding of 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure. As South Africa is a developing country, it is 
imperative that the laws of the land develop with it.  
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CHAPTER 2: MISREPRESENTATION AND NON-DISCLOSURE 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT CONSTITUTES A VALID CONTRACT?  
 
There are numerous principles and elements that must be met in order for a valid contractual 
agreement to be concluded. That which is often taken for granted forms the basic framework 
for day-to-day contracts such as sale agreements and insurance contracts. To understand what 
constitutes a valid contract, it is also necessary to understand the six basic elements of a 
contract, namely offer, acceptance, consideration, mutuality of obligation, competency and 
capacity, and a written instrument.12 One such required element is that there must be a 
consensus or a ‘meeting of the minds’13 between the contracting parties.14 This indicates that 
there must be a consensus between the parties with regard to what is offered and what is being 
accepted.15   
 
Additionally, the contracting parties must see eye to eye with regard to all facets of the 
contract.16 These elements indicate that in order for a contract to be enforceable it must be 
lawful, agreed upon by all parties, all parties must be competent and capable of performing the 
duties set out in the contract, and include a bargaining element.17 Should any of these elements 
be missing, the contract is then void. When a contract is void it is regarded as being null from 
the beginning or conclusion of the contract.18 This concept differs from that of a voidable 
contract which is legally binding until it is invalidated by the option of the party that is protected 
by law.19  
 
Where a party has entered a contract, or otherwise been induced to enter said contract as a 
result of a false representation by the other party, this amounts to misrepresentation.20 
                                                           
12 C MacMillan ‘Elements of the law of contract’ (2012) DPHU available at 
http://www.dphu.org/uploads/attachments/books/books_4071_0.pdf&ved=, accessed on 29 April 2019. 
13 Consensus ad idem.  
14 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 29-30. 
15 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 29-30. 
16 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 29-30. 
17 C MacMillan ‘Elements of the law of contract’ (2012) DPHU available at 
http://www.dphu.org/uploads/attachments/books/books_4071_0.pdf&ved=, accessed on 29 April 2019. 
18 L Nadew ‘Void Agreements and Voidable Contracts: The Need to Elucidate Ambiguities of Their Effects’ 
(2008) 2(1) Mizan Law Review 1. 
19 L Nadew ‘Void Agreements and Voidable Contracts: The Need to Elucidate Ambiguities of Their Effects’ 
(2008) 2(1) Mizan Law Review 1. 
20 R Sharrock Business Transactions Law 9th (2017) 315. 
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Misrepresentation occurs when a false or incorrect statement is made by a contractor or agent 
to the contracting party, which consequently induces the latter party to conclude the contract.21 
The effect of such misrepresentation is that the party who was induced into concluding the 
contract may rescind the contract.22 This can only be done if the misrepresentation was 
material, and is therefore essential to whether the contracting party would have entered into the 
contract or not.23 The duty to disclose a material fact faced by a defendant arises when he has 
sole knowledge of the material fact which the plaintiff would have relied upon and must be in 
line with the boni mores of the community.24  
 
Such actions are regarded as non-disclosure, which is often thought of as misrepresentation by 
silence. As a result, the failure to disclose a material fact to the other contracting party when 
there is a legal duty to do so constitutes misrepresentation.25 Non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation are treated in the same manner, in that they are both grounds for rescission 
of the contract if the defendant is under a duty to disclose such facts and fail to do so.26 
                                                           
21 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7ed (2016) 315. 
22 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 29-30. 
23 SPF and Another v LBCCT/A LB and Another (26492/13) [2016] ZAGPPHC 378 at para 21. 
24 McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd 1995 (2) SA 718 (C). 
25 G Wille Wille's Principles of South African Law 7th (2007) 778. 
26 R Sharrock Business Transactions Law 9th (2017) 134. 
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2.2. DOES A DUTY OF DISCLOSURE EXIST IN SOUTH AFRICA?  
 
It must be noted that in South African law there is no general duty of disclosure.27 However, 
there are circumstances whereby there are exceptions to this rule, and as a result the contractor 
is under a duty to disclose, such as: 
a) when the contractor has actively taken steps to prevent the other party from discovering 
certain facts that would affect his or her decision on whether to enter into the contract 
or not; 28 
b) where the contractor has sole knowledge of the material fact which the plaintiff would 
have relied upon; 29 
c) where the contractor has omitted pertinent facts or has used language that is 
misleading;30   
d) where a change in circumstances renders a fact or declaration, which was previously 
made by the contractor, incorrect.31 
 
The case of McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd32 aptly set out other instances when 
a duty to disclose exists.  
“A negligent misrepresentation may give rise to delictual liability and to a claim for damages, 
provided the prerequisites for such liability are complied with. 
i. A negligent misrepresentation may be constituted by an omission, provided the 
defendant breaches a legal duty, established by policy considerations, to act 
positively in order to prevent the plaintiff’s suffering loss. 
 
ii. A negligent misrepresentation by way of an omission may occur in the form of 
a non-disclosure where there is a legal duty on the defendant to disclose some or 
other material fact to the plaintiff and he fails to do so. 
 
iii.  Silence or inaction as such cannot constitute a misrepresentation of any kind 
unless there is a duty to speak or act as aforesaid33.” 
                                                           
27 ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche 2003 (1) SA 176 SCA. 
28 Dibley v Furter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C). 
29 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 323. 
30 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 323. 
31 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 323. 
32 McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd 1995 (2) SA 718 (C). 
33 McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd 1995 (2) SA 718 (C) at para 726A-G. 
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Each of these principles will be discussed and explored in turn.  
 
2.3. INSTANCES WHEN A DUTY TO DISCLOSE ARISES 
 
2.3.1. Positive steps to conceal facts   
This occurs when the contractor has actively taken steps to prevent the other party from 
discovering certain facts that would affect his or her decision on whether to enter into the 
contract or not.34 This concept can be expressed as fraudulent misrepresentation, which is 
described by Bradfield35  as “the telling of a deliberate lie,” or a false statement of fact, that 
induces someone into a contract. The onus of proving fraudulent misrepresentation is on the 
party who has suffered damages, and must be specifically pleaded.36 It is insufficient for the 
allegation of fraud to be a general one and must be done in a clear and distinct manner.37 
Nevertheless, it is often an uphill battle to prove a claim of fraud as there must be either a 
positive misrepresentation or non-disclosure by either the defendant or his or her agent.38 
Moreover, the plaintiff must allege that the fraud or misrepresentation was not only false, but 
either intentional to induce the conclusion of the contract or negligent.39 
 
The concept of fraudulent misrepresentation can be seen in Dibley v Furter.40  In this case the 
purchaser of a farm claimed that the agreement of sale was rescinded and therefore sued the 
seller for the return of the purchase price of the property, sought to return the merx, as well as 
instituted a claim for damages.41 The purchaser based the claim on the basis that the farm in 
question had a graveyard on a portion of the property.42 
 
The purchaser only became aware of its presence after the contract was concluded, as the seller 
had removed all physical signs of the graveyard. The purchaser expressed that he would not 
have purchased the farm had he known of the graveyards existence.43 The purchaser claimed 
                                                           
34 Dibley v Furter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C). 
35 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 341. 
36 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 343. 
37 SPF and Another v LBCCT/A LB and Another (26492/13) [2016] ZAGPPHC 378 at para 14. 
38 SPF and Another v LBCCT/A LB and Another (26492/13) [2016] ZAGPPHC 378 at para 14 
39 SPF and Another v LBCCT/A LB and Another (26492/13) [2016] ZAGPPHC 378 at para 14 
40 Dibley v Furter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C). 
41 Dibley v Furter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C) at 75. 
42 Dibley v Furter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C). 
43 Dibley v Furter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C) at 76. 
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that this amounted to a latent defect. It is important to note that the duty to disclose is also 
relevant to latent defects.44  
 
Although, in this case the graves did not affect the purpose for which the farm was purchased. 
The court ultimately held that the purchaser could rely on fraudulent misrepresentation, as the 
purchaser would not have bought the farm had he been aware of the existence of the 
graveyard.45 
 
2.3.2. Sole knowledge of the material fact 
It is a common misconception that misrepresentation, and liability as a result of such, 
only occurs when a party has committed a positive act to induce the contract. Conversely, 
a contracting party is also under a duty to disclose any information that he has sole 
knowledge of, which the other party would have relied upon,46 and where silence and 
ultimately a lack of communication to the other party would amount to 
misrepresentation.47 In order to determine whether a failure of a duty to disclose will 
result in the defendant’s failure amounting to unlawfulness, one must look at the general 
test for liability.48 
 
This is expressed as follows:  
“[a] party is expected to speak when the information he has to impart falls within 
his exclusive knowledge (so that in a practical business sense the other party has 
him as his only source) and the information, moreover, is such that the right to 
have it communicated to him ‘would be mutually recognised by honest men in 
the circumstances49” 
 
The principle was explored in Speight v Glass,50 in which the plaintiff had purchased 
shares in a hotel in its entirety, and at the time of the conclusion of the contract he was 
unaware that the town council was exploring the possibility of constructing a road that 
                                                           
44 Dibley v Furter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C) at 82. 
45 Dibley v Furter 1951 (4) SA 73 (C).89. 
46  RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 323. 
47 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 323. 
48  ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche 2003 (1) SA 176 SCA at para 5. 
49 Pretorius and Another v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd (under judicial management) 1965 (3) SA 410 
(W) at para 418E-F. 
50 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D). 
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would run through the property that the hotel was on.51 The seller on the other hand was 
aware of this possible construction, and as a result the purchaser was of the opinion that 
the court should cancel the contract, and he should be reimbursed for the purchase price 
of the property.52 The purchaser based his allegations on the basis that he would not have 
entered into the contract had he been aware of the construction.53 Furthermore, he alleged 
that the seller was under a duty to disclose the planned construction.54 
 
The seller countered that while he was cognizant of the proposed construction, he was 
not informed or in any way aware that the construction of the road had been approved.55 
The court ultimately held that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that the seller 
had deliberately or fraudulently failed to disclose the information.56 It is not common 
practice that the contractor informs the other party of all aspects regarding his knowledge 
of a material characteristic. The court also had to determine whether the seller had sole 
or exclusive knowledge of the construction of the road which the purchaser would have 
relied upon. If this had occurred, then the seller did have a duty to disclose the 
information.57 
 
The court ultimately determined that the seller had no specialised knowledge of the terms 
of the construction.58 The court further agreed with the counter allegation of the seller 
that the necessary information, and full details of the construction plan, was accessible 
to the purchaser through the town council.59 As a result, the claim for the cancellation of 
the contract of sale was dismissed due to the failure of the purchaser to prove that the 
seller had a duty to disclose the information to him.60 
                                                           
51 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 779. 
52 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 783. 
53 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 779. 
54 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 780. 
55 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 779. 
56 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 784. 
57 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 782. 
58 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 783. 
59 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 783 
60 Speight v Glass and Another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 784. 
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2.3.3. Omission or misleading language 
A legal duty to disclose in this instance occurs when the contractor has omitted pertinent facts 
or has used language that is misleading.61 Certain policy considerations may also necessitate 
the communication of certain facts or information to the plaintiff62. Often during the 
negotiation process the contractor may use vague, unclear or elusive language in order to secure 
a sale, or to ensure the conclusion of the contract. Nonetheless, a duty to disclose exists if such 
previously used equivocal terms require clarification.63 This indicates that non-disclosure or an 
omission in the face of the existence of certain circumstances would result in the failure being 
wrongful.64  
 
An obvious example of a scenario where the defendant or contractor has used misleading 
language65 was seen in Marais v Edlman.66 The defendant, the seller of the farm, had 
erroneously informed the purchasers that the borehole on the property had been pumped for 
three years without any issue. Even though this statement was correct, this had in actual fact 
occurred 14 years prior to the sale occurring.67 The defendant also omitted information 
regarding the depth of the borehole, and that it was no longer as deep as it had been 
previously.68 As a result, the court held that this amounted to a non-disclosure of facts.69 
 
2.3.4. Change in circumstances 
This occurs when a change in circumstances renders a fact or declaration, which was previously 
made by the contractor, incorrect.70 It relates to certain circumstances that arise and in turn 
result in a previously made fact or representation, which was truthful at the time of its 
communication, to become incorrect.71 In conjunction with this principle, Bigwood72 explores 
the concept of supervening falsification’ that was seen in the English law case of With v 
                                                           
61 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 323. 
62 McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd 1995 (2) SA 718 (C). 
63McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd 1995 (2) SA 718 (C). 
64 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 287. 
65 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 323. 
66 Marais v Edlman 1934 CPD 212. 
67 Marais v Edlman 1934 CPD 212.at 215-216. 
68 Marais v Edlman 1934 CPD 212.at 215-216. 
69 Marais v Edlman 1934 CPD 212.at 216. 
70 RH Christie Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7th (2016) 323. 
71 R Bigwood ‘Pre-contractual misrepresentation and the limits of the principle in With v O’Flanagan’ (2005)  
64(1) Cambridge Law Journal 94. 
72 R Bigwood ‘Pre-contractual misrepresentation and the limits of the principle in With v O’Flanagan’ (2005)  
64(1) Cambridge Law Journal 94. 
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O’Flanagan,73 which will be discussed further. ‘Supervening falsification’ relates to the 
considerable interval of time that has passed between when the false representation was made, 
and when the contracting party has relied on the aforementioned representation to enter into 
the contract.74  Alternatively, it is then safe to say that when a contractor makes a representation 
that is false, and he is initially unaware of the incorrect nature of the representation, this does 
not amount to supervening falsification. The contractor can be liable for misrepresentation, but 
as he was unaware of the false representation initially he will not be liable for fraudulent 
misrepresentation.75 
 
In With v O’Flanagan case,76 the plaintiff sought to purchase the medical practice of the 
defendant. During the negotiation process, the defendant represented that the practice made a 
profit of £2000 in a year.77 Regrettably during the period between when the representation was 
made and when the contract of sale was concluded, the defendant fell ill and as a result of his 
inability to work the value of the practice declined drastically.78 This decrease in value was 
known to the defendant, but not to the plaintiff and when the latter party consequently became 
aware of this fact, he sought to have the contract rescinded. This claim was based on the 
principle that the defendant had a duty to inform the plaintiff that the circumstances that were 
material to the sale, and had induced him to purchase the practice, were no longer correct. 
 
The court held that the contract could be set aside, regardless of the fact that the contract was 
not based on uberrimae fidei,79 and thus did not form part of the scenarios where English law 
imposes a duty to disclose facts.80 This will be explored further in a comparative exploration 
of how English law and English judicial discretion differs from the approach adopted by South 
African law when dealing with non-disclosure and misrepresentation.  
 
                                                           
73 With v O’Flanagan [1936] 1 All ER. 
74 R Bigwood ‘Pre-contractual misrepresentation and the limits of the principle in With v O’Flanagan’ (2005)  
64(1) Cambridge Law Journal 94. 
75 R Bigwood ‘Pre-contractual misrepresentation and the limits of the principle in With v O’Flanagan’ (2005)  
64(1) Cambridge Law Journal 94. 
76 With v O’Flanagan [1936] 1 All ER. 
77 With v O’Flanagan [1936] 1 All ER.67 at 729. 
78 With v O’Flanagan [1936] 1 All ER.at 730. 
79 R Bigwood ‘Pre-contractual misrepresentation and the limits of the principle in With v O’Flanagan’ (2005)  
64(1) Cambridge Law Journal 94. 
80 KE Gjelsten Pre-contractual duty to disclose information – A comparison between Norwegian and English 
contract law (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Oslo, 2007) 28. 
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2.4. A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT NON-DISCLOSURE AND MISREPRESENATION  
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
South African law is known as an uncodified legal systems that is fuelled by multiple sources, 
such as common law, statute and the Constitution,81 the foundations of which arise from 
Roman-Dutch and English law. South African contract law adopted various concepts from 
these two very different legal systems. The concept of ‘good faith’ in South Africa, which will 
be discussed later on in this chapter and in chapter five, was received from Roman-Dutch law 
in the context of contract law.82 As South Africa has gained its Common Law system from 
England, it is imperative to look at how judicial discretion differs from the approach adopted 
by South African courts. This is considered in relation to whether the difference, if any, can be 
implemented in South African law to ease the burden faced by a contracting party when proving 
a claim of non-disclosure or misrepresentation. This will also provide an avenue for improving 
South Africa’s current practices by adopting the current policies that have already been 
developed in a first world country, and thereafter adapting the policies to suit a unique South 
African model. This will ultimately aid in the answering the question of whether or not a 
blanket duty of disclosure should exist in our law. 
 
2.4.2. Non-disclosure  
Similar to that in South Africa, there is no general rule or duty of disclosure in English law.83 
What has become apparent is that English law has adopted somewhat of a conservative 
approach to imposing liability when there has been a failure to disclose, which stems from the 
reluctance to enforce this duty. As With v O’Flanagan84 is an English law decision and is the 
leading authority in this particular area, it will form an appropriate starting point to explore 
how English law deals with non-disclosure.  
 
As was discussed previously, the court determined that the contract could be set aside, 
regardless of the fact that the contract was not based on uberrimae fidei.85This is important to 
                                                           
81 B Lenel ‘The History of South African Law and its Roman-Dutch Roots’ (2002) 
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82  E van der Sijde ‘The role of good faith in the South African law of contract’ (unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of Pretoria, 2017) 77. 
83 KE Gjelsten Pre-contractual duty to disclose information – A comparison between Norwegian and English 
contract law (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Oslo, 2007) 28. 
84 With v O’Flanagan [1936] 1 All ER. 
85 Utmost good faith. 
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note as while there is no general duty of disclosure, English law also contains certain exceptions 
or scenarios where the nature of the contract, or relationship between the contractants, requires 
a duty to disclose.86 This gives rise to four groups of duty of disclosure: 
“duty to disclose information in contracts uberrimae fidei, duty to disclose information 
in relation to court, tribunal or state agency, duty to disclose information in relations of 
confidence, and duty to disclose information in relations of influence or advantage87” 
 
This indicates that the courts are aware that strict application of the general rule can result in 
inequality. The application of this strict rule was seen in Sykes v Taylor-Rose.88 In this case the 
applicants had purchased a house from the respondents, unaware of the murder that had 
occurred in the house previously.89 When the respondents had purchased the home, they too 
were unaware of its history. They later received an anonymous letter with newspaper articles 
informing them of what had transpired, which resulted in the respondents selling the property. 
A pre-contractual question enquired whether "[i]s there any other information which you think 
the buyer may have a right to know?"90 To which the responding answer was a negative. 
 
After the conclusion of the sale, the applicants were made aware of the history of the house 
through a documentary and were no longer able to stay in the house. When selling the property, 
they felt the history of the property should be disclosed. As a result, the house sold for £25,000 
less than initially asked for. The applicants thereafter instituted a claim of misrepresentation 
against the respondents for the losses they incurred as a result of the misrepresentation, which 
was dismissed in the court a quo. On appeal, the court looked at the pre-contractual question 
and stated that it was intended to be subjective, and the answer was one that was honestly given 
by the respondents.91The court ultimately held that there was no duty imposed upon the 
respondents to disclose the history of the house to the applicants prior to the conclusion of the 
contract of sale. However, the court held that had the question been more specific and less 
subjective, and directly related or enquired as to the value of the property, then the court may 
have found otherwise.92  
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As the meaning of misrepresentation as a contractual concept was explored above when dealing 
with South African law93, it will not be explained further. Despite this, as the duty to provide 
and communicate correct information is regarded as being an expansion of the duty of 
disclosure,94 the legislative remedies imposed in English law will be explored. English law has 
legislation that deals specifically with misrepresentation. Misrepresentation can be looked at 
as occurring in three different categories, namely fraudulent misrepresentation, innocent 
misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation.95The Misrepresentation Act of 196796 
defines what actions amount to negligent, which is dealt with in section 2(1)97 and innocent 
misrepresentation which is dealt with in section 2(2),98 and sets out the remedies that are 
available for such. This is beneficial as it is often difficult or a grey area in determining what 
exactly amounts to a negligent misrepresentation, and what is innocent misrepresentation. 
 
2.5. GOOD FAITH 
 
What has been shown in this chapter is that in South African law there is no general duty of 
disclosure, nevertheless exceptions to this rule does exist. Nevertheless, what must be 
considered is whether a duty to disclose should exist when a circumstance arises that does not 
fall within these conditions or exceptions. An example that is often used to describe this is a 
scenario where a person purchases a house from another, but unknown to the buyer the house 
was the scene of a death or murder in the past.99 This may not affect the use for which the 
property was purchased, nor does it amount to a latent defect. While to the purchaser of the 
house it may not only be uncomfortable for him or her to live in the house where the death had 
occurred, but for some the house may become unliveable. What becomes a pertinent question 
is “should this fact have been disclosed to the potential purchasers?” 
                                                           
93 This definition has been discussed at ‘2.1. Introduction: What constitutes a valid contract?’ above. 
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This forms part of a case study whereby the new purchasers of a house started to hear ‘noises’ 
in their home.100 They were later informed by neighbours that the property had been the scene 
of the death of a child. The purchasers claimed that they would not have purchased the property 
had they known about the death. When the estate agent who sold the house was contacted, he 
stated that he was aware of the death but did not disclose it as the sellers were not obliged to 
do so by law.101 Furthermore, he stated that nobody would want to purchase a home that a 
person had died in.102  
 
What is apparent from this scenario is that the seller was aware that by disclosing this fact, the 
prospective purchasers would be hesitant about concluding the contract. As a result of the non-
disclosure by the seller, the buyers were at a disadvantage as they would not have concluded 
the contract had they been aware of the fact. Correspondingly, as this circumstance was not a 
material fact, a latent defect, nor did it fall under the exceptions whereby a seller has a legal 
duty to disclose a fact, the seller was not obliged to disclose his knowledge of the death.  
 
This gives rise to the question “what can we do to remedy this?” South African law has a similar 
concept to the English law duty of disclosure regarding contracts in uberrimae fidei. Contracts 
relating to insurance or agency are required to have been negotiated in ‘utmost good faith’. 
This means that when contracting with an insurance company, the person seeking insurance 
must disclose all necessary and relevant information to the insurer.103 In comparison, a party 
to a simple contract of sale who has specific knowledge that can impact whether the transaction 
will be concluded or not, has no duty to disclose such information to the other contracting 
party.104 This can be taken to be a direct consequence of the fact that in a contract of sale the 
assumption is that of good faith and not utmost good faith. This then creates the impression 
that our law distinguishes and identifies with fluctuating degrees of good faith, when this is in 
fact not the case.  
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In order for equality to be present amongst contracting parties, the writer is of the opinion that 
contracts uberrimae fidei should become written into the requirements for a valid contract. This 
is currently used where the contract is between parties that do not have the same bargaining 
power, such as an insurer and the insured. Although, if you place this in the context of a contract 
that has been induced as a result of misrepresentation or non-disclosure, this too results in an 




The importance of entering into a contract while being aware of all the material facts, as well 
as equipped with all the necessary information to validly consent to the transaction, cannot be 
overemphasized. Despite this fact, it is still possible for people to be lulled into a false sense of 
security due to any fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the other contracting party, or 
as a result of his or her silence. This can be avoided if there was a duty to disclose certain facts 




CHAPTER 3: CONTRACTUAL AND DELICTUAL DAMAGES  
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE TO AN AGGRIEVED 
PARTY? 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, a party that was induced into entering a contract as a 
result of a material misrepresentation may have the option to rescind said contract.105 This is a 
remedy that is only available to the aggrieved party, by his or her choice.106 The aggrieved 
party may be entitled to claim delictual damages which allows for the misrepresentee to be 
financially compensated for any losses he or she has suffered as a direct result of the 
misrepresentation, whether the aggrieved party chooses to uphold the contract or not.107 What 
must also be noted is that the aforementioned party is not automatically entitled to damages. 
The court will examine whether the element of fault is present, as well as the measure of 
damages, this is regarded as delictual liability.102 The concept of delictual liability will be 
further discussed below.  
 
The usual remedy of rescission and damages that is granted by the courts, applies to fraudulent 
and negligent misrepresentation,103 which will be discussed in detail below.108 The innocent 
party may also institute a claim for damages simultaneously with a claim to rescind the 
contract.104 This is because, as opposed to damages relating to a breach of contract, a claim in 
terms of delict is not inconsistent with a claim for rescission.109 
 
As the judicial system faces an increasing number of cases dealing with fraudulent non-
disclosure, it is often a challenge to enforce the idea that liability for misrepresentation and 
non-disclosure should be overseen by the same rules.110 The attitude of the court in respect of 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation, where the defendant has failed in his duty to disclose, is 
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that these are both grounds for rescission of the contract are regarded as ‘traditional grounds’ 
for rescission.111 
 
Case law has discovered that discrepancies arise from within principles relating to rescission 
due to misrepresentation and quantifying damages due to misrepresentation.112 This arises from 
applying the principles developed for remedies relating to fraudulent misrepresentation to non-
fraudulent misrepresentation.113  
 
As the current system of quantifying damages has difficulties, it is imperative to explore the 
current remedies available to those who have fallen victim to misrepresentation, as well as 




3.2.1. How are claimable damages quantified? 
The current position provides that where a contract concluded based on pre-contractual 
misrepresentation is upheld, damages are generally claimable based on delict.114 In a scenario 
where the aggrieved party or plaintiff elects to uphold the contract and claim damages for 
financial losses suffered, delictual damages will then be quantified traditionally based on one 
of two circumstances; firstly, where the plaintiff was induced to enter into the contract solely 
based on his reliance on the misrepresentation, which is known as dolus dans,115 and secondly, 
where the party would still have entered into the contract. The sole change would however be 
that the terms relating to said contract would have varied as a result of the misrepresentation.116 
This is known as dolus incidens.117 
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With regard to the first instance, the plaintiff would not have concluded the contract if he or 
she was aware of the misrepresentation.118 As a result, the appropriate measure is to place the 
aggrieved party in the financial position that he or she would have been in had the contract not 
been concluded,119 and not to place the aggrieved party in the financial that he or she would 
have been in had the misrepresentation been true.120 
 
In order to quantify the damages related to the particular circumstance, the court will look at 
the value of what the performance would have been and compare this to the value of the 
counter-performance.121 Damage has been suffered, and can be claimed by the plaintiff, when 
the value of the counter-performance is greater than that of the value of the performance.122 
From this statement, it is possible to deduce that should the value of the two amounts be equal 
or if the counter-performance is less than that of the performance, the plaintiff cannot claim for 
damages.123 
 
With regard to the second instance of misrepresentation, this explores the performance that the 
contracting party actually agreed to, and would have received, if the fraud or misrepresentation 
was not present.124 
 
3.2.2. An exploration of fault as a requisite for liability 
In order for an aggrieved party to be successful in his or her delictual claim for damages, the 
element of fault must be present.125 When an aggrieved party seeks to claim damages in delict, 
as a result of a contractual non-disclosure, fault is obligatory.126 Fault in terms of contract law 
comprises of a wilful, reckless and negligent breach of contract.127 This amounts to a failure to 
perform, however the actions of the contractor will only be considered wilful should he or she 
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deliberately decide not to perform.128 The contractor will also be liable for negligent or reckless 
behaviour should he or she fail to ensure proper performance.129 However, should surrounding 
circumstances ensure that performance is impossible, yet the contractor has done all that is 
reasonable possible to avoid a breach of contract, he or she will not have wilfully or negligently 
breached the contract.130 With regard to the element of fault in the context of non-disclosure, 
an objective-subjective test of reasonable foreseeability must be shown.131 This means that 
information that was not communicated to the aggrieved party was in fact material, and he or 
she was unaware of this.132 
 
(a) Fraudulent misrepresentation 
 
When exploring the element of fault in relation to fraudulent misrepresentation, an illustration 
of fraud is that of a deliberate or intentional lie.133 It is submitted that case law dealing with the 
aforementioned claim for damages concentrates on fault in relation to fraud. This was apparent 
in Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd. v Frost,134 and will be dealt with later in this chapter.  
 
This approach was altered in ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche,135 whereby the court explored whether 
a party’s non-disclosure was negligent and in turn met the requirement for fault when 
instituting a claim for delictual liability. 
 
The respondent entered into a written contract to hire a safety deposit box from the appellant, 
ABSA Bank.136 Eight years after the conclusion of the contract, the branch of the bank in 
question was burglarized and multiple safety deposit boxes were broken into, including that 
belonging to the respondent.137 The respondent lost valuable jewellery in the theft and instituted 
a claim against the appellant to recover the value of the items lost.138 The court a quo found in 
favour of the respondent, and the appellant was found liable.139 
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On appeal, the respondent accepted that she did not have a claim in terms of contract, as a result 
the appellant could not be held liable for any loss arising from negligence.140 The respondent 
sought to claim damages on the basis that she had been induced into entering the contract as a 
result of the appellant’s fraudulent non-disclosure of pertinent facts relating to shortcomings in 
the security system.141 Should this action fail, the respondent sought to claim damages as a 
result of the negligent non-disclosure of the appellant.142 
 
The respondent based the aforementioned allegations on the fact that the officials of the 
appellant failed to inform her that the security system lacked motion detectors that was linked 
to the alarm, and that the branch in question did not employ a guard at night.143 These were 
features that officials failed to inform her of, either negligently or intentionally, and were also 
not apparent to a customer in her position.144 Furthermore, the respondent alleged that she 
would not have entered into the contract had she been aware of the inadequacies in the security 
system.145 The court had to determine whether the information regarding the inadequacies in 
the security system formed part of the ‘exclusive knowledge’ of the branch officials.146 This 
explores the concept of involuntary reliance, which states that each party to a contract must 
obtain pertinent information relating to the contract himself or herself.147 
 
This concept was described by Millner148  and relates to situations in which a misrepresentee 
was unable to obtain the aforementioned information, and had to be dependent on the disclosure 
of the other party to protect his or her interests. This is said to occur either when the information 
was within the ‘exclusive knowledge’ of the misrepresentor, or when the parties to the contract 
were in a relationship of trust.149 A duty of disclosure does not exist where the misrepresentee 
failed to obtain the aforementioned information himself or herself, yet failed to do so.150 
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In the event that the aforementioned information is ‘exclusive’, the court has to explore the 
question of “whether an honest person in the position of the branch officials would have 
thought to communicate it to a future depositor?”151 The court provided that an official of the 
appellant would be aware that the security was not at a high level.152 It appears that the 
respondent had an inflated concept of the appellant’s obligations, which in reality only included 
the obligation not to negligently lose or damage the object in the safety deposit box.153 
 
The court emphasized the fact that the respondent undertook the responsibility of insuring the 
contents of the safety deposit box, but failed to do so.154 This suggests that the respondent was 
aware that she was required to bear some risk, in terms of the contract.155 The respondent 
became aware of the level of security at the branch during the eight years in which she removed 
her jewellery to wear, and subsequently returned it.156 
 
Consequently, the court was not swayed by the allegation that the officials of the appellant 
failed to inform her of pertinent information, either negligently or intentionally, which 
subsequently induced to enter into the contract.157 The court further stated that the 
aforementioned information regarding the security did not sufficiently influence her decision 
to contract.158 As a result, the court dismissed the appeal.  
 
(b) Innocent misrepresentation  
 
Innocent misrepresentation occurs when one party to the contract remains silent on a pertinent 
fact of the contract, without the intention to mislead the contracting party, yet this failure to 
disclose ultimately leads to the latter party suffering a disadvantage.159 Where an innocent 
misrepresentation has occurred and has induced a contract, there can be no claim for delictual 
damages.160 Although, it has been stated that an innocent misrepresentation may allow for the 
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aggrieved party to institute a claim for avoidance.161 Avoidance in a contract of sale amounts 
to cancellation or termination by a party to a contract, when the agreement can no longer be 
continued due to impossibility, or alternatively it would be inequitable to enforce performance 
of the contact.162 This may be brought about due to a number of scenarios, including where the 
other party to the contract is in breach of the contract163 through non-performance.164 The 
consequence of this is that all parties to the contract are released from their respective 
obligations in respect of the contract.165 
 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the CISG), 
states that as the termination of the contract in this scenario is one-sided, and gives rise to 
severe consequences, it has provided for strict requirements for the remedy of avoidance.166 
The requirements for avoidance are as follows: 
i. There must be a fundamental breach of contract;167 
ii. The aggrieved party must provide the guilty party with notice;168 
iii. There may be a time limit (this is not always required);169 
iv. And lastly, if there are goods involved there must be the return of “substantially 
unchanged” products.170 
 
The CSIG has emphasized the fact that in order for one party to unilaterally terminate the 
contract, the other party must have committed what it regards as a “fundamental breach”.171 
This was reinforced by other academics that state avoidance or termination of the contract 
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should only be a viable remedy where there has been a “fundamental non-performance” of the 
contractual obligations by the other party.172 A party should not be allowed to avoid the 
contract, and his or her corresponding obligations and performance due to a simple breach, 
such as late or sub-standard performance.173 It is submitted that this is vital in upholding the 
principles of pacta sunt servanda174 and freedom of contract, as parties should hold sacred 
contracts that they have willingly entered into.175 
 
(c) Negligent misrepresentation  
 
Bradfield176 explores the fact that there has been a long-standing debate regarding whether a 
party, who was induced into entering a contract as a result of a negligent misrepresentation, 
could claim damages as a result of such. This matter was ultimately explored and decided in 
Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd. v Frost.177 In the Appellate Division, there were multiple causes 
of action however, the research will only focus on the allegation that respondent was induced 
to use the new pesticide as a result of the appellant’s employee making an unlawful and 
negligent misstatement,178 as this is pertinent to this discussion.  
 
Frost, the respondent, was the lessee of three farms. Upon which, one of the farms in question 
comprised of a vineyard and “other lands”.179 In order to properly maintain the vineyards, a 
pesticide was required to be sprayed to eliminate any weeds, yet had no ill-effects on the 
budding vines.180 The pesticide was applied by the use of a tractor but, inclement weather often 
made this process impossible.181 Consequently, the respondent changed pesticides to one that 
could be sprayed onto the vineyard by means of a helicopter.182 
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The new pesticide came into contact with the crops on the “other lands” and caused damages 
amounting to R55 000, which resulted in the respondent instituting action against appellant for 
damages in respect of the loss caused to his crops.183 The respondent alleged that a 
representative of the appellant, during negotiations to conclude an oral agreement to spray the 
new pesticide by helicopter, represented that the pesticide could be sprayed by helicopter 
without damaging the other crops.184 
 
Corbett CJ stated that a person who was induced to enter a contract due to a negligent 
misrepresentation can institute a delictual claim for damages.185 It was additionally stated that 
as a formula to determine unlawfulness is not in existence, each matter will be determined on 
a case by case basis. The circumstances surrounding each case will explore whether a causal 
connection exists between the misstatement and the monetary losses suffered.186  
 
The court ultimately determined that the employee, acting as the appellant’s representative, 
had created a reasonable expectation that the appellant would prevent damage from occurring 
to the other crops.187 The appellant had failed to ensure the truthfulness of the representations 
made by taking the necessary and reasonable steps.188 As a result, the appellant had made the 
representations negligently, and its conduct was unlawful.189 The appeal was consequently 
dismissed.190 
 
3.3. DOES A PARTY HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE TO CLAIMING DAMAGES IN 
DELICT?  
 
The research will now aim to explore prospective developments in the law, which may well 
provide an important avenue to advance our knowledge and understanding of misrepresentation 
and non-disclosure. As South Africa is a developing country, it is imperative that the laws of 
the land develop with it.  
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In Trotman v Edwick,191 Van den Heever JA explained the difference between quantifying 
damages in contract as opposed to delict as follows: 
“A litigant who sues on contract sues to have his bargain or its equivalent in money or 
in money and kind. The litigant who sues on delict sues to recover the loss which he 
has sustained because of the wrongful conduct of another, in other words, that the 
amount by which his patrimony has been diminished by such conduct should be 
restored to him.”192 
 
Du Plesis193 proposed that an alternative to the aforementioned traditional approach of 
quantifying damages should adopted. The recommendation states that a claim should either be 
combined into a claim of delict and that of contractual liability, or alternatively one solely based 
on contractual liability.194 The exploration of this proposed approach will aim to determine 
how to formulate damages resulting from pre-contractual misrepresentation and fraud, and how 
this can be enumerated as contractual damages.195 More importantly, this study will provide an 
insight as to whether Du Plesis’ approach to contractual liability, as a remedy for 
misrepresentation, is in fact a viable option. 
 
The proposed approach states that where a party has been induced to enter a contract as a result 
of a misrepresentation or a lack of consensus, and the aggrieved party elects to uphold the 
contract, he or she should have contractual remedies available.196 This will ensure that the 
parties still have a valid and enforceable contract in which the ordinary rights, obligations and 
performance will continue to apply in terms of the contract for both parties.197  
 
With regard to a breach of contract, this will arise where an inadequate performance is rendered 
by one of the parties, and is not what was provided for in terms of the contract.198 The general 
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standard for determining wrongfulness will in turn also be used to determine whether the 
aforementioned performance has been carried out within the terms stipulated in the contract.199 
In the event of a breach of contract occurring, the normal common-law remedies will apply.200 
Where the aggrieved party has deduced the misrepresentation to form part of the contract, either 
in the form of a warranty or a term of said contract, he or she should have a contractual action 
available.201  
 
Du Plesis states that an advantage of relying on a solely contractual approach to claiming 
damages is that it enforces certainty and eliminates the need for different approaches to 
quantifying damages.202 This will in turn eradicate challenges associated with applying 
delictual elements to a contractual matter, and subsequently importing a contractual approach 
to quantifying damages into a claim in terms of delict.203 
 
This approach was adopted by Jansen JA in the dissenting judgement of Ranger v Wykerd.204 
The dissertation will only explore the dissenting judgement as this is pertinent to quantifying 
damages solely based on a contractual method and the difficulties that arise as a result of the 
traditional method of quantifying damages.  
 
The respondents in this case were a married couple, and although the second respondent owned 
the property which was sold to the appellant, the first respondent conducted the negotiations 
regarding the sale.205 The appellant was eager to purchase a property with a swimming pool, 
which the first respondent was made aware of during the negotiation process.206 The 
respondents were cognisant of the fact that the swimming pool had faults that affected its use, 
which was not brought to the attention of the appellant.207 During the negotiation process, the 
first respondent made a fraudulent misrepresentation to the appellant by stating that the 
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swimming pool was structurally sound and in good condition.208 This representation induced 
the appellant to purchase the property for R22 000; subsequently, the appellant later became 
aware of the defects and spent a further R1 250 to repair the damage.209 
 
The appellant instituted a delictual claim against the first and second respondents for the cost 
of the repairs.210 As the first respondent was not a party to the contract, the appellant could not 
claim contractual damages of any form.211 Due to the fact that the fraudulent misrepresentation 
would not have prevented the appellant from entering the contract as he would have factored 
in the repair costs when purchasing the property,212 the court a quo held that he failed to prove 
any patrimonial loss. On appeal, the majority found the first respondent liable in delict.213  
 
In the dissenting judgement, Jansen JA indicated that while the court had adopted the delictual 
measure of damages, it had also determined damages by “making good the representation” 
which in actuality was adopting a contractual approach.214 It was stated that although this 
approach is in direct opposition to the method currently adopted by our legal system, which 
aims to ensure that a claim for damages is made in delict, this would assist in lessening any 
confusion as a result of the differing methods that have been adopted by the court.215 As a 
result, in the event that it is appropriate to apply to the case in question and notwithstanding 
the fact that the action arose from delict, a contractual measure of damages should be 
adopted.216 
 
In order to demonstrate that the proposed approach is viable, Du Plesis provides a guideline as 
to how to determine damages resulting from pre-contractual fraudulent misrepresentation.217 
The court in Colt Motors (Edms) Bpk v Kenny218 devised a guideline comprised of a practical 
approach to determine when an aggrieved party would need to prove market value when 
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instituting a claim for damages.219 This guideline was adopted and amended in order to suit 
enumerated a claim for contractual damages.220 
 
The first step explores whether the statement of fraudulent misrepresentation amounted to a 
term of the contract in question.221 Secondly, the aggrieved party needs to prove that there is a 
causal connection between the misrepresentor’s actions and the breach of contract.222 The last 
step explores the enumeration of contractual damages.223 
 
The intention of the proposed approach is to dissuade fraud in contractors.224 South African 
law of damages does not provide for punitive damages, therefore it will be difficult to hold a 




It is imperative to explore remedies that are available to aggrieved parties who have fallen 
victim to misrepresentation. Proposed alternative remedies and methods of quantifying a claim 
for damages is necessary not only to conduct research that will explore innovative avenues to 
remedy longstanding problems, but also allows for the simultaneous development of what has 
already been recognised in the field.  
 
The development of Du Plesis’ proposed principles aims to deviate from the traditional method 
of quantifying damages that are suffered as a result of misrepresentation,226 while still 
respecting the current method and adopting it to the future. With regard to the feasibility of the 
proposed alternative, the claiming of both contractual and delictual damages is not currently 
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unheard of.227 As was stated by Bradfield,228 a statement may simultaneously be a fraudulent 
misrepresentation and a term of the contract in question.  
 
However, the current process is that this can only occur when the aggrieved party has not 
sought rescission of the contract, which is not in line with a claim for breach of contract.229 
Furthermore, the claim for delictual damages must solely relate to the fraudulent 
misrepresentation, while damages can only be claimed as a result of the representation being a 
term of the contract and consequently a breach of contract.230 
 
What must be noted is that granted developing the law alongside societal developments and 
advances is valuable, awarding damages based on a contractual measure provides for any 
fraudulent misstatement to become a term in a contract.231 Due to the fact that there is no 
blanket rule determining how damages should be granted, each matter must be determined on 
a case-by-case basis.232 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION  




In South Africa, common law is regarded as a secondary source of law, which is derived from 
Roman-Dutch Law.233 The principles adopted from this source of law have governed multiple 
aspects and areas in the law of contract, including warranty against caveat subscriptor, freedom 
of contract, the passing of the risk rule, the parole evidence rule, latent defects,234 and 
exemption clauses that exempt a person from liability for a latent defect which is also known 
as a voetstoots clause.235 
 
This chapter aims to discuss the common law position specifically relating to latent defects in 
conjunction with exemption clauses, and explore how the introduction of the Consumer 
Protection Act236 (herein referred to as the CPA), which will be discussed at length later in the 
chapter, has altered the approach to this.  
 
Prior to the enactment of the CPA, consumers often signed contracts that contained ambiguous 
clauses that we colloquially refer to as “fine print”. It is stated that this was done because 
consumers often believed it was futile to object to standard form contracts, which are structured 
on a “take it or leave it” basis.237 The enactment of the CPA changed this drastically. The CPA 
applies to every transaction relating to the supply or promotion of goods or services that has 
occurred within the Republic of South Africa, unless otherwise exempted by the CPA.238 In 
addition, a ‘transaction’ is defined as relating to any person who is party to an agreement with 
one or more persons for the purpose of supplying goods in exchange for anything of value 
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given in return, such as monetary payment.239 The CPA not only aims to ensure the rights of 
consumers are protected, but has promoted fair business practices.240  
 
The CPA does not apply, among others, to transactions of promotion or supply to the State, 
instances where the consumer is a juristic person with an asset value or annual turnover that is 
equal to, or in excess of, the threshold value and services relating to an employment contract.241 
This then prompts the question that, if based on the fact that the scope of the CPA excludes 
certain contracts of sale which do not fall under its domain, will the common law position apply 
in these scenarios?242 Due to the scope of the CPA, where a contract does not fall under that 
domain, the legal position will revert to the common law position that applied before the CPA 
came into effect.243 The common law in relation to the law of contract is any law that was 
created by the courts, and not by legislature.244 This is regarded as an uncodified legal system, 
as the judges develop and interpret laws that are already in existence.245  
 
4.2. LATENTS DEFECTS  
 
4.2.1. What is a latent defect? 
The duty to disclose also has an impact on a ‘latent defect’ when entering into a contract.246 
The term ‘latent defect’ was aptly described in Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts 
Construction Co Ltd247 as any abnormality that affects or impairs the usefulness or 
effectiveness in relation to the purpose for which the res vendita248 was sold or is used, and 
could not be identified by a reasonable inspection made by an ordinary person prior to the 
purchase of the thing.249 It must be noted that the seller is under an obligation to disclose latent 
defects only, and not patent defects, only if he or she is aware of such defects.  
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Patent defects can be easily discovered upon a reasonable inspection, while a latent defect is 
within the “exclusive knowledge” of the seller.250 By looking at the usefulness of the thing sold 
we can determine that the test explored by the court is objective in nature.251 This test relates 
to what a reasonable person would have been able to detect, and not what a person with expert 
knowledge would notice.252 This means that if a buyer of “normal” intelligence and ability 
would have noticed the obvious defect, it would be patent.253 
 
The current position in South African law is that the defect in question must be material in 
nature and as a latent defect is anything that affects the usefulness of the thing sold. The defect 
must therefore have an impact of the usefulness of the merx.254 In addition the defect must also 
have been in existence at the time the contract was concluded. The purchaser bears the onus of 
proving that at the time, he or she was not aware of the existence of the defect.255  The duty of 
disclosure automatically applies to the seller regardless of whether he or she was aware of the 
defect, and this duty includes the seller adopting the responsibility should a defect be present.256  
On the other hand, there are methods in which the seller can exempt himself from liability for 
latent defects.  
 
4.2.2. The common law warranty against latent defects 
  
(a) Exemption clause 
 
The common law allows for a seller to include an exemption clause that expressly excludes 
certain forms of liability, or he or she may include a voetstoots clause.257 An exemption clause 
                                                           
250 M Nortje ‘Pre-contractual duties of disclosure in the South African common law (1)’ (2015) 2015(2) Journal 
of South African Law 355. 
251 RV Cupido Misrepresentation by Non-disclosure in South African Law (unpublished LLM thesis, 
Stellenbosch University, 2013) 60. 
252 RV Cupido Misrepresentation by Non-disclosure in South African Law (unpublished LLM thesis, 
Stellenbosch University, 2013) 60. 
253 M Nortje ‘Pre-contractual duties of disclosure in the South African common law (1)’ (2015) 2015(2) Journal 
of South African Law 355. 
254 J Barnard ‘The influence of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 on the warranty against latent defects, 
voetstoets clauses and liability for damages’ (2012) 45(3) De Jure 456. 
255 J Barnard ‘The influence of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 on the warranty against latent defects, 
voetstoets clauses and liability for damages’ (2012) 45(3) De Jure 457. 
256 RV Cupido Misrepresentation by Non-disclosure in South African Law (unpublished LLM thesis, 
Stellenbosch University, 2013) 59. 




is used in order to exclude or exempt liability that a contractant would normally face in terms 
of a contractual agreement.258 They are used in standard form contracts, and can take the form 
of an exclusion of liability for a breach of contract or a warranty for latent defects.259 This type 
of clause can be highly unfair and one-sided as it may deprive the other party the opportunity 
to seek legal redress260, as well preventing the seller from being held liable unless they acted 
fraudulently. These types of agreements may also have an effect on the purpose and crucial 
requirements of an agreement.261 Despite all of this, exemption clauses are not a new concept 
in South African law of contract. Our law has since early times regarded exemption clauses as 
valid, and has been used in Roman-Dutch law.262  
 
Additionally, since early times, despite how unfair or harsh these terms may appear to be, the 
courts regard them as binding and enforceable where such a clause is clear and unambiguous.263 
Certain scenarios exist whereby exemption clauses will not be enforced. This occurs when the 
clause is contrary to public policy or if, in the context of such an agreement, it is regarded as 
unusual.264  
 
This was seen in Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel,265 whereby Naidoo instituted a claim for damages 
against the Birchwood Hotel when a gate to the entrance of the hotel fell and caused Naidoo 
bodily injuries.266 Birchwood Hotel claimed that it was exempt from liability for damages due 
to prominently displayed disclaimers which were found in and around the hotel.267 The court 
had to determine whether these disclaimers would in fact exempt the hotel from liability. 
 
                                                           
258 JC Kanamugire ‘The Current Status of Exemption Clauses in the South African Law of Contract’ (2014) 5(9) 
MJSS164. 
259 JC Kanamugire ‘The Current Status of Exemption Clauses in the South African Law of Contract’ (2014) 5(9) 
MJSS 165. 
260 Y Mupangavanhu ‘Exemption clauses and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: An assessment of 
Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ)’ (2014) 17(3) PER 1172. 
261 Y Mupangavanhu ‘Exemption clauses and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: An assessment of 
Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ)’ (2014) 17(3) PER 1172. 
262 JC Kanamugire ‘The Current Status of Exemption Clauses in the South African Law of Contract’ (2014) 5(9) 
MJSS 164. 
263 Y Mupangavanhu ‘Exemption clauses and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: An assessment of 
Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ)’ (2014) 17(3) PER 1167. 
264 Y Mupangavanhu ‘Exemption clauses and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: An assessment of 
Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ)’ (2014) 17(3) PER 1167. 
265 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ). 
266 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ) at para 2. 
267 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ) at para 5-6. 
36 
 
In so doing, the court explored the court stated that a party who signs a contract is typically 
bound to the ordinary meaning and effect of the words in the contract.268 The court went further 
and stated that exemption clauses that are contrary to public policy would not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.269 In order to explore this, the court looked at the two-stage test set out 
in Barkhuizen v Napier.270 The first question in the test asks whether the clause in question was 
objectively unreasonable, and the second question looks at, if the clause was found to be 
reasonable then should it be enforced in the circumstances.271 In applying this test to the 
circumstances of Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel, the court stated that a guest in a hotel, and this is 
not an activity that is risky or a circumstances in which the guest expects to have his life 
threated.272 The court held that to prevent Naidoo from claiming redress for his injuries would 
be contrary to the notions of justice and fairness.273 
 
This case indicates that although an exemption clause may be harsh, one that excludes 
liability for negligently causing bodily injuries or death will be contrary to public policy. In 
contrast, any exemption clause that is contrary to public policy cannot and will not be 
enforced.274   
 
 (b) Voetstoots clause 
 
Since Roman-Dutch times, the voetstoots clause has been described as being the foundation of 
trade.275 It allows for the merx to be sold “as is” or “with all its faults”. This means that should 
the parties to the contract agree that the sale be voetstoots, should purchaser discover that the 
merx is defective after the conclusion of the sale, the seller cannot be held liable for the 
aforementioned impairment.276 This clause eliminates the purchaser’s use of aedilition 
remedies, which will be discussed further in the chapter,277 and actio empti.  
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It must be noted that where the seller was aware of the defect and had failed to disclose this 
information to the purchaser, he or she is guilty of fraudulent non-disclosure.278 The courts 
have ruled that the seller can no longer rely on the voetstoots clause where he has deliberately 
misrepresented a material fact relating to the defect, 279 as was illustrated in Banda v Van der 
Spuy.280 In this case, the appellants had purchased a house which had a leaking thatch roof, 
from the respondents. The roof leaked both prior to the sale, and after the sale which led to the 
dispute.281 As the agreement was voetstoots, the appellants instituted an action based on actio 
quanti minoris, for a reduction to the purchase price in order to fix the defects.282 The appellants 
had to prove that the respondents had the requisite knowledge of the defects and fraudulently 
neglected to inform them of such.283  
 
There needed to be an assessment of the objective facts in order to determine whether the 
respondents were aware of the defect which caused the leak, and whether they were aware that 
the repair was not a permanent solution to the problem.284 As the roof had begun to leak before 
the sale, the person who conducted the repair had provided a warranty for the restoration which 
had lapsed by the time the property was sold to the appellants.285 The respondent had 
dishonestly informed the appellants that the warranty was still valid, as he was aware that the 
repairs were not sufficient and the lack of a valid warranty could affect the sale of the 
property.286 The Supreme Court of Appeal stated that once this is paired with the fact that the 
respondent did not have faith in the adequacy of the repairs, and was aware that the leak will 
cause structural defects, the respondents were obliged to disclose this information to the 
appellants.287 As a result, the court held that the respondents, the sellers, were liable for the 
latent defects that affected the intended purpose of the res vendtia.288 
 
In addition, the severity of the leaking roof as a latent defect is such that the house can no 
longer be regarded as habitable. As a result of the fraudulent non-disclosure of the defects, the 
                                                           
278 M Hands ‘The Voetstoots clause – and other pitfalls: property law’ (2013) 13(1) Without Prejudice 24. 
279 M Hands ‘The Voetstoots clause – and other pitfalls: property law’ (2013) 13(1) Without Prejudice 24. 
280 Banda and another v Van der Spuy and another [2013] JOL 30458 (SCA). 
281 Banda and another v Van der Spuy and another [2013] JOL 30458 (SCA) at para 1. 
282 Banda and another v Van der Spuy and another [2013] JOL 30458 (SCA) at para 1. 
283 Banda and another v Van der Spuy and another [2013] JOL 30458 (SCA) at para 6. 
284 Banda and another v Van der Spuy and another [2013] JOL 30458 (SCA) at para 11. 
285 Banda and another v Van der Spuy and another [2013] JOL 30458 (SCA) at para 13. 
286 Banda and another v Van der Spuy and another [2013] JOL 30458 (SCA) at para 16. 
287 Banda and another v Van der Spuy and another [2013] JOL 30458 (SCA) at para 22. 
288 Banda and another v Van der Spuy and another [2013] JOL 30458 (SCA) at para 24. 
38 
 
voetstoots clause could not be relied on by the respondents.289 The appellants were entitled to 
the difference between the purchase price and the value of the house with the defective roof.290  
 
The appellants instituted an alternate claim based on the fraudulent or, should that not succeed, 
negligent misrepresentation by the respondents in relation to the representation regarding the 
repair of the roof and the condition of the roof.291 The first appellant stated that he would not 
have concluded the transaction had he been aware that the warranty had lapsed.292 Likewise if 
he was aware of the defects in the roof, he would have sought a quotation to determine the cost 
of any repairs he would have to make and he would have negotiated this into the contract with 
the respondents.293 This suggests that the fraudulent misrepresentation had either induced the 
appellants into concluding the contract, or agreeing to pay the purchase price requested by the 
respondents. As a result, the court stated that the appellants had suffered a patrimonial loss, 
and the appellants were entitled to the reasonable cost of repairing the roof.294 
 
What this illustrates is that a seller may only rely on a voetstoots clause for protection if he or 
she was honest, and did not hide any latent defects. Additionally, should the purchaser succeed 
in proving fraudulent non-disclosure on the part of the seller, which is a difficult task, he or she 
is entitled to restitution295 in the form of aedilitian remedies, or based on delict as a result of 
the fraudulent misrepresentation.296 
 
The court also stated that failure to obtain approval for construction would amount to a latent 
defect.297 This was ultimately decided in Odendaal v Ferraris,298 whereby the respondent 
purchased a property from the appellant after an inspection of the property, throughout which 
the appellant had concealed a substantial list of defects relating to the property.299 After moving 
into the property, the respondent discovered that the outbuilding which he was not able to gain 
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access to during the inspection, had water damages and a partially collapsed roof.300 
Furthermore, the respondent discovered that the outbuilding had only been approved as a 
storeroom, the carport had been refused approval on three previous occasions, and the carport 
failed to comply with regulations.301 After a period of consideration and back-and-forth 
between the parties, in which the respondent instructed the bank to place a hold on payment in 
relation to the transaction302 pending quotations that would determine the cost of bringing the 
structures up to municipal code,303 the appellant sought to cancel the contract and instituted 
eviction proceedings.304 
 
The court held that the failure to obtain statutory authorisation in relation to the carport and 
outbuilding amounts to defects in which the voetstoots clause may apply.305 The court held that 
despite this, the respondent had failed to prove a claim of fraud against the appellant, and as a 
result he cannot avoid the consequences of the voetstoots clause.306 The court held further that 
the respondent had objectively viewed the property and had no basis to suspend payment and 
transfer of the property.307 As a result, the court granted the order of eviction.308  
  
(c) Aedilitian remedies 
 
Aedilition remedies provides that a seller is liable to a purchaser for any latent defects that 
renders the thing was partially or completely unfit for the use it was purchased.309 Where a 
latent defect is present, the purchaser has two options, he or she may either rescind the contract 
and claim a return of the purchase price, or claim for a reduction in the purchase price.310 
 
The purchaser may rely on actio redhibitoria in order to rescind the contract if the defect is 
such that he or she would not have purchased the merx. The purchaser will need to return the 
thing and can claim a refund of the purchase price.311 The purpose is to place the parties in the 
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position they were in prior to the conclusion of the contract.312 The purchaser must within a 
reasonable time, notify the seller of his or her intention, and he or she cannot show any intention 
that indicates the desire to retain the thing or the right to use the actio redhibitoria is lost.313 
However, if the purchaser would still have purchased the merx but done so at a reduced price, 
he or she may rely on the actio quanti minoris. This allows for the purchaser to seek a reduction 
in the purchase price however, if the purchaser bought the thing while having knowledge of 
the defect, the right to use the actio quanti minoris is lost.314  
 
As seen above, despite the fact that there is a breach of warranty against latent defects, 
aedilitian remedies will not be available where the agreement includes an express or tacit 
guarantee, if the warranty expressly excluded, the defect is patent, the defect did not exist at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract, the sale was voetstoots, or if the defect was 
corrected.315 
 
4.3. THE APPROACH OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT  
 
4.3.1. Latent defects  
The preamble of the CPA acknowledges that there are vulnerable members of South African 
society, as well as the high level of illiteracy and economic inequality amongst consumers due 
to historical disparity and disadvantages. This creates the thought that such vulnerable members 
of society need greater protection.316 Prior to the enactment of the CPA, the idea that 
responsibility falls on the purchaser to ensure that the thing being purchased is in good 
quality.317 The CPA has subsequently changed this stance. 
 
Chapter 2 Part H of the CPA deals with the consumer’s right to fair, just and reasonable terms 
and conditions. It is necessary to now focus on section 55 deals with the consumer’s rights to 
safe, good quality goods and section 56 relates to the implied warranty of quality, in order to 
determine how the enforcement of the CPA has affected common law provisions. These 
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sections provide that any goods, land and buildings sold must be done with an implied warranty 
that the goods are free of latent defects.318 
 
Section 55 ensures that consumers receive goods that are of good quality, lacks defects, is 
effective in relation to its quality and can be used for the purpose for which it was purchased.319 
Should the consumer inform the supplier of the precise reason for which the product is being 
purchased, or the use of these goods, and if the supplier ordinarily supplies these products and 
conducts himself in a manner that indicates that he is knowledgeable regarding the products, 
the consumer has a right to expect that the goods he or she will received will be reasonably 
suitable for the task.320 
 
Prior to the enactment of the CPA there was a distinction between a latent defect and a patent 
defect, as discussed above321. However, in terms of section 55(5) (a), the CPA provides that 
this distinction is now irrelevant. Additionally, the CPA states that the defect need not have 
been detectible by the consumer prior to delivery. Looking at this practically, this should then 
negate the need to explore the objective test that relates to what a reasonable person would 
have been able to detect, and not what a person with expert knowledge would notice.322 This 
means that it is unnecessary for the court to look at whether the defect would have been 
detectible by a buyer of “normal” intelligence and ability323 or whether the defect was within 
the “exclusive knowledge” of the seller.324 Section 55(5) (a) and (b) of the CPA does not apply 
if the consumer has agreed to accept goods in a specific condition.325 Despite the fact that there 
is no specific clause relating to the voetstoots clause, it can be implied that where the purchaser 
has not expressly agreed to purchase goods “as is”, should he or she receive goods other than 
what was requested or of a substandard quality, the supplier cannot rely on the voetstoots 
                                                           
318 M Hands ‘The Voetstoots clause – and other pitfalls: property law’ (2013) 13(1) Without Prejudice 24. 
319 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 s 55(2) (a)-(d). 
320 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 s 55(3). 
321 This issue has been discussed at ‘4.2.1. What is a latent defect?’ above.  
322 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 s 55(3). 
323 M Nortje ‘Pre-contractual duties of disclosure in the South African common law (1)’ (2015) 2015(2) Journal 
of South African Law 355. 
324 M Nortje ‘Pre-contractual duties of disclosure in the South African common law (1)’ (2015) 2015(2) Journal 
of South African Law 355. 
325 JM Otto ‘Redress in Terms of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act for Defective Goods 
Sold and Financed in Terms of an Instalment Agreement’ (2014) 26(2) SA Merc 261. 
42 
 
clause.326 The approach of the CPA to the voetstoots clause will be discussed further in the 
chapter. 
 
Section 56 relates to the remedies available to consumer that have been sold defective goods 
where the agreement as governed by the CPA.327 This section provides that any agreement that 
relates to the supply of goods to the consumer contains an implied provision whereby the 
producer or importer and distributor or retailer warrant that the goods comply with the terms 
set out in section 55.328 Section 56(1) (2) of the CPA provides that should the goods not comply 
with section 55, the consumer may return the goods to the supplier within six months, without 
any penalty and at the expense of the supplier. The consumer than has the choice to have the 
supplier either repair or replace the defective goods, or refund the purchase price.329  
 
Although not expressly stated in the CPA, if a defect is discovered within six months of the 
sale of the goods it is presumed to have been present at the time of the sale.330 As a result, this 
negates the previously discussed common law clause which states that the defect must also 
have been in existence at the time the contract was concluded. Furthermore, the purchaser no 
longer bears the onus of proving that the defect existed at the time of the sale,331 the onus now 
falls on the supplier to prove that it was not defective.332 
 
This was seen in Mia v Car King Second-Hand (Pty) Ltd and Another,333 in which the National 
Consumer Tribunal (herein referred to as the NCT), had to consider a claim for the return of 
the purchase price of a vehicle by the respondent due to defects in the vehicle.334 The applicant 
had purchased the vehicle from the dealership, in relation to a ‘rent to own’ agreement, and 
soon discovered that the vehicle had defects that required it be returned to the dealership for 
                                                           
326 JM Otto ‘Redress in Terms of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act for Defective Goods 
Sold and Financed in Terms of an Instalment Agreement’ (2014) 26(2) SA Merc 261. 
327 JM Otto ‘Redress in Terms of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act for Defective Goods 
Sold and Financed in Terms of an Instalment Agreement’ (2014) 26(2) SA Merc 261. 
328 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 s 56(1). 
329 Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 s 56(2) (a) – (b). 
330 JM Otto ‘Redress in Terms of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act for Defective Goods 
Sold and Financed in Terms of an Instalment Agreement’ (2014) 26(2) SA Merc 262. 
331 J Barnard ‘The influence of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 on the warranty against latent defects, 
voetstoets clauses and liability for damages’ (2012) 45(3) De Jure 457. 
332 JM Otto ‘Redress in Terms of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act for Defective Goods 
Sold and Financed in Terms of an Instalment Agreement’ (2014) 26(2) SA Merc 262. 
333 Mia v Car King Second-Hand (Pty) Ltd and Another [2017] ZANCT 128. 
334 Mia v Car King Second-Hand (Pty) Ltd and Another [2017] ZANCT 128 at para 17. 
43 
 
repairs.335 The defects included a hooter that would sound automatically as soon as the vehicle 
was driven out of the dealership, the clutch made a noise when pressed, and a faulty gearbox.336 
Upon collection of the vehicle, it was unfortunately involved in a motor vehicle collision which 
was reported to the insurer and subsequently revealed that the vehicle had previously been 
involved in another collision, which the respondent had not disclosed to the applicant upon 
purchase of the vehicle.337    
 
In order to decide this matter, the NCT had to consider sections 55 and 56 of the CPA. The 
NCT stated that in terms of section 55 (2)(a) of the CPA, the applicant was entitled to the 
delivery of a vehicle that was without defects.338 Section 56 (2) of the CPA stated that if the 
vehicle was discovered to have defects, within six months of delivery of the vehicle, the 
applicant was entitled to either request the vehicle to be repaired to replaced.339 The applicant 
elected to have the vehicle repaired, which complied with section 56 2(a) of the CPA.340 The 
applicant would have benefitted from these repairs if the vehicle was not involved in the 
collision; additionally, as a replacement vehicle was provided during the period of the repairs 
and the vehicle had been insured, the applicant had suffered no substantial loss.341  
 
Therefore, the applicant could not be placed in a better position than she would have found 
herself had the collision not occurred.342 The only way that the applicant could have 
successfully claimed that the vehicle be replaced, or the return of the purchase price of the 
vehicle under section 56 (3), was if the collision had not occurred and the defects had not been 
fixed within three months of the vehicle being handed in for repairs.343 The NCT concluded 
that although the respondent had sold the applicant a vehicle with a defective engine344, the 
applicant failed to discharge the onus that any of the conduct on behalf of the respondent 
amounted to that which was prohibited in terms of the CPA.345 
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4.3.2. Voetstoots clause  
There is no doubt that the CPA provides more protection to the consumer, nonetheless there is 
much confusion surrounding how the CPA affects the voetstoots clause as there is no provision 
that directly deals with this in the CPA. As was stated above the supplier can escape section 56 
if he or she describes every detail of the product that is to be sold, as well as including every 
defect in the agreement that the purchaser will sign.346 The consumer must then expressly agree 
to purchase the property in its current state.347 It is stated that sellers of property are also no 
longer able to protect themselves from subsequent claims by purchasers due to defects by using 
the voetstoots clause.348 
 
What must also be noted is that it is impossible for a supplier to contract out of section 55.349 
As a result, even if a customer purchases goods “as is”, he or she is still entitled to receive 
goods that comply with section 55.350 It is stated that there needs to be clarity regarding the 
voetstoots clause and the CPA as scenarios that have no clear cut and dry answer exists. This 
may occur where a consumer is sold a product by a retailer that is defective, but he or she did 
not enter into a contract with a voetstoots clause; however, the retailer purchased the product 
from a distributor in terms of a contract that did include a voetstoots clause351. In this scenario, 
the CPA would allow the consumer redress against the retailer in terms of section 56, but it is 
unclear as to whether the consumer has a claim against the distributor.  
 
To allow such a claim twice would surely be unfair. As a result of certain loose ends regarding 
the CPA, it is imperative that transparency is gained either through the judiciary or through a 
clarification of the law.  
 
4.3.3. Non-disclosure 
The concept of non-disclosure was explored in chapter 2. This section aims to discuss the 
statutory intervention by the CPA in relation to non-disclosure. Chapter 2 Part F of the CPA 
deals with the consumer’s right to fair and honest dealing. Section 41 relates to false, 
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misleading or deceptive representations and prohibits a supplier from making a false, 
misleading or deceptive representation, either directly in indirectly.352  
 
It must be noted that section 41 of the CPA does not apply with retrospective effect, which was 
noted in Accordian Investments (Pty) Limited v National Consumer Commission.353 The NCT 
had to determine this matter which dealt with defects to a vehicle, in which the application for 
such was brought on the last day of the prescribed period, which is fifteen business days from 
the date of the receipt of the notice.354 This is set out in Table 2 of the Regulations of the 
CPA.355 The NCT stated that respondent could not rely on section 41 on the basis that in 
addition to the fact that there was no evidence of false, misleading or deceptive representations, 
it cannot be applied retrospectively in relation to agreements that have been entered into prior 
to the effective date.356  
 
Worth mentioning is the fact that the CPA prohibits the supplier from exaggerating, making 
use of an innuendo, or using ambiguous language in relation to a material fact, or deliberately 
concealing a material fact.357 This is of vital importance as it imposes a statutory duty to speak 
on a seller, even when he or she has failed to correct what amounts to a false representation as 
a result of the consumer’s misapprehension, regardless of whether this is caused by his or her 
actions.358 As the CPA does not provide a definition or guidelines as to what constitutes 
materiality, this is a scenario where the legal position will revert to the common law position 
that applied before the CPA came into effect,359 but only in relation to what constitutes 
materiality.360  
 
The CPA does not state whether the supplier must have intentionally misled the consumer, or 
whether the non-disclosure or misrepresentation must be unintentional or innocent. Based on 
the wide range of scenarios that are covered in section 41, it can be presumed that the CPA 
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intends to apply to all types of non-disclosure.361 What must be noted is that due to the lack of 
an express provision relating to the intention of the supplier, the section 41 CPA does not 
expressly state whether a supplier should be held liable for innocent non-disclosure.362 This 




It is submitted that although the CPA solves many problems, it also leaves something to be 
desired, as was discussed above in relation to the obscurity regarding the CPA and the 
voetstoots clause, and the lack of a requirement that discusses the intention of suppliers or 
sellers with regard to non-disclosure. The failure by the CPA to expressly determine the 
meaning of certain words and phrases is not limited to these sections.363 This leaves the court 
to determine this on its own.364 
 
Despite its shortfalls, the CPA has provided a considerable mechanism for easy and informal 
access to dispute resolution.365 In terms of section 69 of the CPA which deals with 
“enforcement of rights by [the] consumer”, it allows for the consumer to enforce any rights 
provided for in the CPA. This section also provides for avenues that the consumer must 
approach prior to approaching the courts for relief. These avenues provide for the consumer to 
approach “an ombud, the consumer courts, the National Consumer Commission and the 
National Consumer Tribunal to obtain relief.”366 This is vital as vulnerable members of society 
may not have the ability to approach the courts, either due to illiteracy or poverty. The CPA is 
also highly lauded as it allows consumers to still access common law remedies in conjunction 
with the other forms of relief, after the aforementioned avenues have been exhausted.367 The 
need for developments in our law cannot be overemphasized, and the areas in which the CPA 
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can be developed and clarified should not overshadow the importance of the enactment of such 
a piece of legislation in South African law. 
48 
 
CHAPTER 5: POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS TO PREVENT NON-
DISCLOSURE AND MISREPRESENTATION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION: IS THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF CONTRACT LAW 
APPROPRIATE IN SOUTH AFRICA?  
 
South African law of contract is based on an amalgamation of Roman-Dutch law and English 
law, which has resulted in a mixed legal system that is lauded worldwide.368 However, due to 
the fact that vital legal sources were in Latin or Dutch, the English law of contract was adopted 
in South African law verbatim.369 As this system has been used in our law for such an extensive 
period of time, it has become the backbone to the formation of a contract. Additionally, the fact 
that it was adopted into South African law after it had already been developed in another 
country as a working and thriving system370 may result in a ‘don’t fix what is not broken’ 
attitude.  
 
The law of contract was not designed with our unique South African society in mind. The 
requirements needed to enter into a valid contract does not consider the good faith negotiations 
that citizens enter into on a daily basis,371 or the concept of ubuntu that is exclusive to South 
Africa. There has been a call to develop these rules and the common law in light of the 
Constitution,372 but the courts have stopped short every time.  
 
This chapter will explore the concept of ubuntu, the failure of the judiciary to give the necessary 
prominence that ubuntu and good faith needed, and how these concepts should be developed 
in relation to contract law in order to avoid pre-contractual non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation. 
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5.2. UBUNTU AND GOOD FAITH  
 
It can be stated that ubuntu encapsulates what it means to be South African. Ubuntu is a 
philosophical concept that is comprised of cultural and communal aspects.373 The notion can 
be articulated through the phrase “ubuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” which translates to “a person 
is a person through other people”.374 It is stated that the word ‘umuntu’ signifies a person’s 
“humaneness”,375 and emphasizes the importance of the community as opposed to the needs or 
interests of just the individual.376 When a person refers to ubuntu, the words immediately 
conjure feelings and thoughts of unity, a willingness to help and compassion and consideration 
for the needs of others, and a deep seated sense of justice.377 
 
In cases of defamation, ubuntu has been the reason the use of an apology is suggested of 
damages.378 This was seen in the case of Dikoko v Mokhatla379, whereby the Constitutional 
Court held that the Constitutional value of human dignity is closely related to ubuntu.380 In 
cases of defamation, the concept of mutual respect, dignity and harmony should be emphasized 
in our law instead of seeking financial compensation which will further the animosity between 
the parties and may cause financial loss for the defendant.381 The court reinforced the idea that 
it must not be forgotten that the main purpose of compensation is not to punish the defendant, 
but to restore dignity to the plaintiff.382 In scenarios like these it appears that the court has 
gotten the position right. However, the use of ubuntu in a legal sense has not been fully utilized 
due to factors such as cultural narrow-mindedness, ignorance and a lack of clarity regarding a 
definition of the word.383  
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Even though there is no exact meaning of ubuntu and can be regarded as vague, the concept is 
often described in the same manner as fairness, justice, good faith and reasonableness.384 This 
was seen in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Limited v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd385, which 
is often regarded as a missed opportunity and failure by the Constitutional Court to develop the 
common law in this regard, purely as a result of a technicality.386 
 
This case dealt with a dispute regarding a lease whereby Everfresh challenged an ejectment 
claim by the lessor, Shoprite387 on the basis that Shoprite refused to make a bona fide attempt 
to negotiate the renewal of the lease in good faith.388 Therefore, Everfresh contended that the 
right to evict did not accrue to Shoprite unless a bona fide attempt to negotiate was made.389 
The Constitutional Court had to consider whether to develop the law of contract to be in line 
with the Bill of Rights and constitutional values.390 The issue of developing the common law, 
as stated above, was not raised in the court a quo or on appeal and was raised in the 
Constitutional Court as a court of first instance.391  
 
Everfresh contended that the common law should be developed to state that parties that agree 
to negotiate should have to do so reasonable, and in good faith.392 Shoprite contended that such 
a provision, in relation to good faith, is too vague to be included in our law.393 The minority 
judgement went on to find in favour of Everfresh by stating that that whether good faith should 
be developed into a requirement in contract law is of vital importance.394 Furthermore, the 
concept of ubuntu is of vital importance, and citizens may place a higher value on negotiating 
in good faith as a result of this.395 Furthermore, the inequality of bargaining power during 
negotiations between vulnerable and often poor individuals and powerful corporations should 
not be ignored.396 People should not be allowed to abscond from negotiations purely on the 
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basis that they have found a more lucrative alternative.397 Although this appeared to mean that 
the common law should be developed to give effect to ubuntu and good faith, this was not the 
case. The majority judgement did emphasize the importance of ubuntu by stating that 
contracting parties should relate to one another in good faith, and that there is no reason that 
constitutional values would not require the negotiation between parties to be done in a 
reasonable manner and in good faith.398 Despite this, the court held that there was no 
“exceptional circumstances” that would persuade the Constitutional Court to be a court of first 
and last instance.399  
 
The mere fact that Everfresh did not raise the issue of developing the common law in the High 
Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal first, resulted in the Constitutional Court sidestepping 
what would have been a ground-breaking judgement. Despite the failure of the court to develop 
the common law, what the Everfresh case indicates is that the Constitutional Court is willing 
to explore and develop the role of good faith in relation to ubuntu in the law of contract.400 It 
is submitted that good faith in relation to ubuntu provides for an ethical standard in contracting 
that is contrary to the approach by the Supreme Court of Appeal in relation to good faith.401  
 
The Supreme Court has adopted a conservative approach regarding good faith, and surrounding 
concepts of fairness, ubuntu and reasonableness.402 The court regards good faith has a creative 
function, but is not the most important value in contract law.403 This needs to be placed in 
context by exploring the reason for this type of approach. What has been discovered is that the 
Supreme Court of Appeal needs to constantly pay regard to the doctrine of stare decisis, and 
consider how any judgement it makes will affect lower courts.404 What also needs to be 
considered is that the approach by the Supreme Court of Appeal may be heavily influenced by 
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autonomy, contractual freedom and the maxim pacta sunt servanda.405 The maxim dictates that 
agreements that are freely entered into by contractants must be enforced.406 Nevertheless, this 
should not mean that contractual freedom is absolute.407  
 
This conservative approach was criticised by the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v 
Napier.408 This case dealt with the constitutionality of a time limitation clause.409 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal warned that the fact that a term in a contract is harsh does not mean that it is 
in contravention of constitutional values.410 The principles of autonomy and dignity were 
correspondingly emphasized.411 Ngcobo J in the Constitutional Court criticised the approach 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal, and stated that pacta sunt servanda is not a “sacred cow” that 
should have a higher regard than any other principle.412 This is not the correct position in law, 
as the common law is also subject to constitutional scrutiny and control, therefore pacta sunt 
servanda is also subject to constitutional values.413 
  
It must be understood that although pacta sunt servanda is a time-honoured part of South 
African common law,414 this cannot be a shield to the Supreme Court of Appeal to hide behind 
in order to avoid constitutional development.415 It is submitted that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal can no longer afford to sit back and hope that the Constitutional Court will solve the 
matter. This then leads to the question ‘what are the possible solutions?’ 
 
5.3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT  
 
It is stated that considering the fact that the purpose of the CPA is to ensure the rights of 
consumers are protected416 and the preamble acknowledges the vulnerable members of society, 
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it is peculiar that concepts such as good faith and ubuntu, which deal with fairness, are not in 
a position of esteem in the common law or under the CPA.417 
 
Although section 41 of the CPA relates to the statutory intervention by the CPA in relation to 
non-disclosure and ways in which this can be prevented, as was discussed in chapter 4, this 
section is not without its flaws. It is submitted that in order to prevent pre-contractual 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure, along with the development of the common law in light 
of constitutional values in relation to ubuntu and good faith, the CPA should have an express 
term that requires parties to a contract to negotiate in good faith. This would take steps towards 
addressing the issue of unequal bargaining power between parties, which may also be a cause 
for non-disclosure.418 Moreover, if parties have a duty to negotiate in good faith, this will allow 
for the contracting parties to relate to one another.419 Additionally, as was seen in chapter 2, 
there are scenarios whereby a duty to disclose is imposed.420 This is reinforced by section 41 
of the CPA. This should also be the position regarding ubuntu and good faith as there is no 
reason that constitutional values would not require the negotiation between parties to be done 




The aim of this dissertation was to explore the effect non-disclosure, as a form of 
misrepresentation, has on the liability of contracting parties in the South African law of 
contract. As was determined in chapter two, although there is no general duty of disclosure,422 
certain scenarios may arise in which the duty to disclose will be imposed on a contractant. 
There are still hurdles regarding what information should be disclosed prior to concluding a 
contract, in addition to material facts, and whether a party should be obliged to disclose any 
additional information at all. This is weighed against the concept of good faith and ubuntu 
during the negotiation process on one hand, and the maxim pacta sunt servanda after the 
contract has been concluded, on the other.423  
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This dissertation has discovered that although the concepts of ubuntu and good faith are often 
regarded by the courts as vital in our society, particularly in light of constitutional values as 
seen above, these concepts are not given the importance and prevalence that they require in 
order to have a meaningful effect on the eradication or prevention of pre-contractual non-
disclosure and misrepresentation.  This is because the quest for profit by big corporations, or 
even a regular civilian contractant when entering into contracts with an ordinary citizen, 
promotes the approach adopted by the courts that favour self-reliance and self-interest.424 This 
leaves no room for disclosure in a competitive marketplace.425 
 
Where non-disclosure is acknowledged as a form of misrepresentation, this may give rise to 
penalties for the wrongdoer and remedies for the aggrieved party. Chapter three discussed the 
available remedies, as well as proposed alternative remedies and methods of quantifying a 
claim for damages, in the form of combining a claim into one of delict and that of contractual 
liability, or alternatively one solely based on contractual liability.426 It is necessary to explore 
innovative avenues to remedy longstanding problems, but also allows for the simultaneous 
development of what has already been recognised in the field.  
 
The aim of this last chapter was to show that although there are many remedies available to 
those who have fallen victim to misrepresentation, as discussed in chapter three, and statutory 
preventative measures as well as remedies that are available in the form of the CPA as discussed 
in chapter four, there needs to be further preventative measures. There needs to be a 
development of the common law that is in line with a South African model of thinking and 
contracting. This developing needs to extend to the CPA and should take into consideration 
good faith, ubuntu and a sense of community values.427 The aim should be to eradicate 
misrepresentation, and not just aim to remedy the instances where it does occur. Parties in a 
contract need to regard each other with mutual respect, and not just as a profit making 
interaction. As a result, it is submitted that that the aforementioned development will force 
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courts to not only take notice of the principles and concepts that underpin the common law that 
relates to non-disclosure, but to engage with it in a meaningful manner.428 
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